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This contribution engages with Sara Kendall’s and Sarah Nouwen’s article on the legacy of  the Internation-
al Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and their call for an ethos of  institutional modesty.1 I much support 
the nuanced approach that underlies their call and I see it as a prerequisite to properly and adequately appre-
ciate the ICTR’s past existence and operation. I would even be open to moving one step further in the 
direction of  an ethos of  sobriety. Rather than seizing the momentum to celebrate accomplishments and 
highlight milestones, legacy-talk and legacy-construction of  international criminal tribunals should entail a 
form of  reckoning. Indeed, as suggested by Kendall and Nouwen, the “justices not done” and the “justices 
pending” must be part and parcel of  the ICTR’s legacy-constructions so as to offer a fair balance and to 
capture the ICTR’s overall performance, explicitly accounting for results as well as omissions.2  
Since the reach of  international criminal tribunals is legally, politically, and practically limited, omissions, or 
black holes, are unavoidable. A better acknowledgement of  such omissions may have general educative value. 
In this spirit, the moment of  legacy-building could constitute an opportunity to emancipate from internation-
al criminal tribunals’ straightjackets and an opening to move beyond the dominant spotlight that international 
criminal law (ICL) offers. In a temporal sense, legacy-talk and thinking seem to be tied to the end-point of  an 
international criminal tribunal’s physical existence, and as Kendall and Nouwen put it, in case of  the ICTR the 
bids for immortality increased steadily as the signposts of  closure came nearer.3 Yet, instead of  succumbing 
to this tendency to “colonize the future,”4 the need for legacy could also be transformed into a chance to 
move beyond ICL’s spotlight and to enter a space that allows for engagement with narratives, questions, facts, 
and responsibilities that hitherto received less limelight as they could not be squeezed into the strictures and 
language of  ICL.  
Building on Kendall’s and Nouwen’s fascinating exploration of  the ICTR’s legacy and particularly the talk 
about legacy, this contribution furthers the argument in favor of  modesty and suggests ways to think about 
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legacy, and particularly the ICTR’s legacy, in a more balanced manner. Using the metaphor of  ICL as a spot-
light, it submits that black holes are also constituents of  legacy and should be treated as such.  
International Criminal Law as a Spotlight 
International criminal law acts as a spotlight in several ways. It is at its core concerned with the application 
of  norms that belong to the corpus of  jus cogens.5 The entire area of  law thus attracts significant attention 
through the power of  the concepts that it uses. This power determines the intensity of  the spotlight. Given 
this intensity and power of  attraction, framing a situation as an international crime or calling for an Interna-
tional Criminal Court-referral has become a mainstream response to any type of  contemporary crisis. The 
language and lenses of  ICL are nowadays also increasingly used by actors other than courts. Human rights 
rapporteurs, commissions of  inquiry, and NGOs use ICL labels to alert the international community of  
wrongdoing and to shed light on situations of  gross human rights violations.6  
By definition, ICL tells a compelling story. It exposes, and it does so in a dualistic manner that appeals to 
the human psyche which is equally conditioned to categorize in good versus evil. An act either constitutes an 
international crime, or it does not; and a person either carries criminal responsibility or not. More than any 
other type of  legal process, ICL processes offer a very selective picture of  what transpired, as several scholars 
have already observed on different occasions.7 Indeed, ICL singles out concrete acts and attaches individual 
criminal responsibility thereby reducing broader situations to the criminal responsibility of  specified individu-
als. It thus filters realities through the use of  precise definitions and categories of  responsibility including 
concomitant rules of  interpretation guiding their application, as well as through the use of  the highest eviden-
tiary standards and other strict rules of  procedure. Shaped by this register of  ICL, the mandates of  
international criminal tribunals and the extent of  their jurisdiction determine the scope of  ICL’s spotlight. 
Facts and entities that cannot find a place within this architecture of  ICL remain outside the spotlight.  
Already at the moment of  the ICTR’s establishment back in 1994, Security Council discussions demon-
strated a recognition of  ICL’s spotlight-potential. Precisely for such “spotlight-reasons,” the new Rwandan 
government at the time contested the ICTR’s proposed jurisdiction as also set out by Matheson and Scheffer 
in their contribution to AJIL’s Legacy-symposium.8 Discontent with the inclusion of  war crimes in the 
ICTR’s substantive jurisdiction and the extension of  the temporal jurisdiction beyond the end of  the geno-
cide to the entire year of  1994, Rwanda ultimately even voted against the establishment of  the Tribunal. In a 
spirit similar to Rwanda’s, i.e., with a view to escaping scrutiny, France opposed backdating the temporal 
jurisdiction to 1 October 1990, the date of  the original Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invasion.9 Situated in 
the region, but not directly implicated, Kenya criticized the substantive jurisdiction as being incomplete. It 
argued in favor of  more holistic investigations that would also examine the downing of  the aircraft killing the 
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Presidents of  Rwanda and Burundi as well as the invasion of  Rwanda prior to that.10 These discussions that 
took place over twenty years ago reflect a political sense and keen awareness that setting the jurisdiction of  an 
ad hoc tribunal is an exercise with great spotlight-ramifications.  
The ICTR’s Black Holes  
Immediately after its establishment, the ICTR started to prosecute individuals for genocide as it was tasked 
to do. Over a lifespan of  more than twenty years, this endeavor resulted in the key figures as meticulously 
detailed on the ICTR/Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunal’s (MICT) legacy website.11 Crucial acts 
and events that were ultimately not prosecuted at the ICTR include the following: the ICTR did not adjudi-
cate the RPF’s October 1990-invasion, it did not investigate and prosecute the downing of  President 
Habyarimana’s airplane, and it did not prosecute any RPF members for alleged crimes against humanity and 
war crimes. Those black holes have different origins. Pre-1994 events were kept out of  the spotlight from the 
start by the drafters of  the Statute, as set out above, and the ICTR Trial and Appeals Chambers confirmed 
this temporal boundary on several occasions, inter alia in the Media case.12 This black hole was thus predeter-
mined by the ICTR’s mandate combined with judicial interpretive choices and confirmations. It was equally 
not envisioned by the drafters to bring the downing of  the plane within the ICTR’s substantive jurisdiction. It 
has been suggested that the Prosecutor could have investigated and prosecuted this nonetheless as a war 
crime, and while this would indeed have required some creative thinking,13 it is well known that innovative 
constructions were not entirely absent in the early years of  the ad hoc tribunals. Hence, the suggestion was not 
without any merit. Yet here again, ICTR actors—this time the Prosecutor—confirmed the drafters’ focus. 
The statutory exclusions did not pre-empt the defense to litigate on these matters but to no avail.14 As regards 
the allegation of  crimes against humanity and war crimes committed by the RPF, those fell squarely within 
the jurisdiction but remained equally unaddressed for other reasons, as also explained by Kendall and 
Nouwen in their article.15  
Beyond black holes that result from architectural design and prosecutorial or judicial choice, the ICL para-
digm as such also has the tendency to leave counterfactuals in the shadow. In the context of  Rwanda, these 
counterfactuals regard questions such as: What if  the RPF had pursued its political aspirations to return in a 
less violent manner back in 1990? What if  the RPF had worked together with the MDR, the moderate party 
of  Twagiramungu, to implement the 1993 Arusha Peace Agreements? Instead, the RPF’s decision to attack in 
October 1990 and its decision to break the cease-fire in February 1993 definitely contributed to an escalating 
scene.16 In his book From War to Genocide, former ICTR expert witness and Rwanda scholar, André Guichaoua 
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describes the bipolarization strategies that extremist RPF-factions (as well as extremist Hutu-factions) en-
gaged in to delay and obstruct the implementation of  the Arusha Peace Agreements.17 The RPF’s actions in 
the period between 1990 and 1994 cannot all be easily captured in ICL terms and rubrics and there is no 
point in stretching international criminal responsibility to breaking point. But by offering such a dominant 
spotlight, ICL-institutions tend to steal the limelight of  other types of  responsibilities, including moral and 
political responsibilities, that also deserve international attention.  
Hence, the ICTR offered a narrow spotlight as a result of  its predetermined mandate combined with prose-
cutorial and judicial choice, whereas ICL more generally offers a dominant spotlight in the sense that it focuses 
exclusively on certain acts that carry a specific type of  responsibility thereby ignoring acts that may in fact 
have been crucial for the turn of  events. Black holes are thus to some extent the inevitable outcome of  a 
choice by others to establish an international criminal tribunal and the point therefore is not to blame only 
the ICTR for not doing something it was never supposed or able to do. The main argument here is rather that 
there may be merit in the ICTR raising awareness of  its own limits, and more broadly of  the limits of  ICL, 
and the moment of  closure and legacy construction seems the right moment to do so. 
Legacy-Construction as an Opportunity to Emancipate from ICL’s Straightjacket 
ICL, and by implication, international criminal tribunals are thus capable of  telling only a limited story. 
They may contribute to a historical record, as the ICTR did by unequivocally establishing genocide, but 
certain acts, events, and contexts that are crucial to understand the complexities of  what happened in Rwanda 
are left out of  the equation as they do not fit ICL’s straightjacket or a tribunal’s jurisdictional strictures. But 
jurisdiction does not necessarily need to act as a blueprint for legacy. While ICL zeroes in, legacy-construction 
may be the moment to zoom out and to overcome the binary approach that ICL brings in so many ways. 
Legacy as the moment to open up to stories that the ICTR could not tell.  
Framing legacy as an opportunity to create awareness of  the ICTR’s narrow spotlight and possibly to move 
into a space beyond ICL may be particularly important in the context of  Rwanda, given its current political 
climate. Various scholars have exposed how the single genocide narrative (pensée unique) has by now become 
state ideology and how any account or narrative that deviates therefrom is branded as genocide denial or 
revisionism.18 Yet, there are still many untold stories and underground narratives that do not deny the geno-
cide as such but that just relate to different pieces of  the puzzle. Those stories deserve to be told as well. The 
closure of  the ICTR does not signify the endpoint of  history. In fact, ICTR Trial Chamber I underscored as 
much in the Military I case when it found that conspiracy had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt as 
regards the accused in that case. It held: 
Other or newly discovered information, subsequent trials or history may demonstrate a conspiracy in-
volving the Accused prior to 6 April to commit genocide. This Chamber’s task, however, is narrowed 
by exacting standards of  proof  and procedure, the specific evidence on the record before it and its 
primary focus on the actions of  the four Accused in this trial. In reaching its finding on conspiracy, the 
Chamber has considered the totality of  the evidence, but a firm foundation cannot be constructed 
from fractured bricks.19 
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Even if  the Chamber’s finding on a lack of  conspiracy may well be correct and does therefore not need to 
be overturned by historians or other scholars, the statement more generally demarcates ICL’s boundaries and 
there is merit in echoing such a finding at the MICT-website by way of  legacy-message. 
Concluding Thoughts on Legacy 
In their analysis, Kendall and Nouwen identify a range of  potential legacies, including the ICTR’s imprint 
on the historical record and more tenuously a potential contribution to peace and reconciliation.20 Perhaps the 
two are less separate than their treatment in distinct subsections suggests. A reconciled, peaceful, and sustain-
able society presupposes a certain shared reading of  historical events,21 and at the very least an environment 
that allows questions about recent history to be posed. This does not seem to be the case for Rwanda today.22  
In its afterlife and through its legacy website, the ICTR/MICT is right to accentuate its conclusions about 
the genocide that occurred thereby ensuring that it is never forgotten. Yet, in addition to enumerating results, 
legacy constructions can, and should, also embrace black holes. In this sense it might be worthwhile if  the 
ICTR/MICT’s legacy website better recognized ICL’s limits and if  it were to acknowledge that there are 
stories which the ICTR, being an international criminal tribunal, was incapable of  telling. But indeed, that 
kind of  legacy-telling does presuppose an ethos of  institutional modesty (which is perhaps not such a modest 
call). 
 
20 Kendall and Nouwen, supra note 1, at 222-224 and 227-230. 
21 See also, MARK J. OSIEL, MASS ATROCITY, COLLECTIVE MEMORY, AND THE LAW (1997). 
22 See, e.g., Magnus Taylor, Debating Rwanda under the RPF: gap between “˜believers’ and “˜unbelievers’ remains wide, AFR. ARGUMENTS (Oct. 
8, 2013). On the politics of  memory, also on the part of  those still denying the genocide, see GUICHAOUA, supra note 17. 
